CHINA'S AND INDIA'S PERSPECTIVES ON ARMED INTERVENTIONS IN AFRICA AND SYRIA by Chan, L-H & Lee, PK
1  
 
Intermingling Norms and Interests: China’s and India’s Perspectives on Armed 
Interventions in Africa and Syria1   
Lai-Ha Chan and Pak K. Lee  
When both China and India sat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 
2011-12, it deliberated whether to invoke Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter 
to endorse military intervention in Africa and the Middle East. China and India 
demonstrated almost identical voting patterns and acquiesced to the intervention in 
Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Mali but balked at an attempt in Syria. Despite their 
divergent political systems, what was the glue that held them together? Why were 
they opposed to external intervention in Syria only? Was Libya a game changer for 
their perception of military intervention?  
 
We contend their behaviour can be explained by an interplay between norms and 
interests. While norms and material interests are often understood as being in tension 
with each other, we argue that rational and social factors interact with and penetrate 
each other in a dialectical relationship in which norms define for actors – China and 
India here – what constitutes their legitimate interests, empowering them to pursue 
their interests, and in the pursuit of their interests, the actors are tempted to reinforce 
or change prevailing norms. Their similar voting patterns at the UN were shaped by 
four inter-connected norms with regard to (un)justifiable military intervention.  
 
Anti-US hegemonic imperialism 
First, China and India share with each other a sui generis national identity of post-
colonial, re-emerging powers that are jointly opposed to US liberal imperialism. The 
Libyan crisis has confirmed their lingering suspicions that the US would use the 
pretext of humanitarian intervention to make wars for ulterior purposes, and the 
abstaining states could do little to constrain the scope of intervention. There was an 
‘erroneous’ image in China and India of an aggressive, imperialist US wishing to 
provoke another war in the Middle East. Apparently many specialists in the two 
countries were unaware of the initiatives of both France and the UK in the UNSC, the                                                         
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conflicts between France and NATO over the leadership of the intervening force and 
the internal disagreement within the Obama administration about the feasibility of the 
war. The shared norm of opposing US hegemonic intervention with a hidden agenda 
of regime change is, in particular, shaped by a ‘collective historical trauma’ and ‘post-
imperial ideology’ as a result of their painful colonization at the hands of Western 
imperialist powers in the 18th and 19th centuries. This collective identity as the Asian 
victims of the Western imperialism has empowered them to unite around opposition 
to any mission-civilisatrice intervention in Syria. By comparison, the US was not 
convinced of the strategic value of intervening in West Africa, and the French-led 
intervention was multilateral. 
 
Concern over failed states 
For China and India, external intervention would be less offensive if the state in 
question has no functioning government. Without external intervention, Côte d’Ivoire 
and Mali would likely fall into civil war. In addition, militias in northern Mali 
contained terrorists. In contrast, Syria has had a reasonably well-functioning central 
government. China has been worried about the negative impact of Syria’s descent into 
political anarchy and a disruption the regional balance of power on its national 
security. China claims that links are forged between ISIS and Uyghur extremists in 
Xinjiang, which has allegedly resorted to escalating violence against the Chinese 
government since 2008.   
 
Regional initiatives without capacity 
The third norm that would justify external intervention is the presence of regional 
initiatives to resolve regional crises but lack of material means to accomplish the 
initiatives. The regional organizations of the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation were strongly behind the UNSC 
resolutions regarding Libya. It was the Arab League that asked the UNSC to impose a 
no-fly zone over Libya in March 2011. The Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) was proactive in taking action against Gbagbo in the Ivorian post-
election crisis. Similarly, the crisis in Mali showed that both ECOWAS and the AU 
did not have the funding and logistics to accomplish the envisaged initiative. In 
contrast, both regional consensus and regional initiatives about intervention in Syria 
were absent. Lebanon supported the Libya intervention but not the Syria one. The 
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Syrian civil war is perceived as a Sunni Arab attempt to oust the Assad regime 
whereas Bashar al-Assad is regarded as an Arab nationalistic leader. Lebanon, 
Yemen, Algeria and the Shiite-led government of Iraq rejected calls for imposing 
stronger sanctions against the Assad regime.  
 
Political mediation 
Believing that peace cannot be made by war, China and India insist on resolving 
intrastate conflicts by political mediation. Also, after the Libya intervention, they 
have growing concern over how R2P’s Pillar 3 would be implemented on the ground. 
India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) tried in August 2011 to mediate the Syrian 
intra-state conflict. China also supported the role of the UN as an impartial mediator 
in the same crisis and participated in both Geneva Conference I and II in 2012 and 
2014 respectively. In attending the Geneva II peace talks in January 2014, China put 
forward the ‘Chinese Way’ (Zhongguo fangshi) to handle hot-spot situations, insisting 
on non-violent conflict resolution and the primary role of the UN in the process. 
Before the French intervention in West Africa, global and regional mediations were 
attempted to resolve the Ivorian and Malian crises. Their failure to avert violence 
made the military intervention less ‘imperialist’ and less objectionable to China and 
India.  
 
In sum, whereas there are attempts to explain China’s and India’s shifting policies 
towards military intervention by focusing narrowly on two countries, Libya and Syria, 
and the transition in their policy stances, we advance a more comprehensive account 
that covers Chapter VII-type interventions in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali that happened 
around the same time. The Libya intervention per se was not a pivotal ‘game 
changer’, as these norms have taken shape prior to, during and following the 
intervention. The behaviour of the two Asian re-emerging powers can be better 
explained by an intermingling of norms and interests, in which anti-US liberal 
imperialism, concerns for state failure, preferences for regional initiatives and 
political mediation to resolve civil wars stand out. 
